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U.S. hospitals and physicians have been known to charge 
uninsured patients and patients re­
ceiving care outside their health­
plan networks an average of 2.5 
times what most health insurers 
pay and more than 3 times their 
actual costs.1 Controversy over 
list prices triggered more than 
120 lawsuits in 2004 and 2005,2 
and the debate has found new 
relevance with increased calls in 
Congress for pricing transparen­
cy and the requirement in the Af­
fordable Care Act (ACA) that 
nonprofit hospitals publicize their 
discounting policies for unin­
sured patients. The theory of im­
plied contracts, a foundation in 
most first­year courses in contract 
law, offers a useful legal and eth­
ical mechanism for handling these 
troubling problems in health care 
billing.
A staple law­school hypotheti­
cal illustrates the usual function 
of implied contracts: a physician 
encounters an unconscious strang­
er in the street who requires im­
mediate medical attention. The 
physician promptly gives the 
stranger the requisite emergency 
care and later submits a bill for 
her services. Is she entitled to 
payment?
According to elementary con­
tract principles, she is. Had the 
stranger been conscious and 
able to negotiate a contract be­
fore he required medical atten­
tion, he clearly would have con­
sented to purchase the medical 
services. When parties are un­
able to negotiate — because of 
insufficient time or the inability 
to communicate, for example — 
the law imputes an “implied con­
tract,” creating a legal obligation 
that mimics one created by mu­
tual assent.3
This legal argument is usually 
invoked to enforce payment for 
medical services to which patients 
cannot expressly consent, but the 
logic of implied contracts works 
both ways: just as the law im­
putes an obligation to pay, it 
similarly imputes a price — that 
to which the patient and provider 
would have agreed. The doctrine 
thus limits the amount that pro­
viders can reasonably expect to 
receive to the prevailing market 
price. Accordingly, an implied­
contracts approach informs the 
way the law should handle accu­
sations that providers use “list 
prices” to overcharge patients.
In a profession that places a 
high premium on informed con­
sent, there are several reasons 
why providers do not obtain 
meaningful “informed financial 
consent” from patients before en­
tering into financial agreements. 
Long­standing professional norms 
prevent discussion of fees before 
a physician cares for the sick, 
and enormous accounting com­
plexity causes both providers and 
patients to lack the capacity to 
negotiate and assent to a bill. But 
the profession’s failure to insist 
on informed financial consent 
has both triggered sharp criticism 
and fueled untamed health care 
prices, necessitating a better ap­
proach to assigning prices in con­
tracts for health care services.
There are at least four mecha­
nisms that can help solve the 
problem of excessive list­price 
billing. The first, which could be 
labeled a “market­based approach,” 
is to require greater disclosure of 
providers’ prices. Policy scholars 
have argued that greater billing 
transparency would enhance price 
competition among providers, and 
calls for more public reporting of 
average or list charges are gain­
ing momentum. Although such 
aggregated reporting does little 
to help patients understand their 
financial options at the bedside, 
it offers the hope that greater 
transparency will bring list prices 
down to competitive levels.
A second approach, which ap­
peals to professionalism, empha­
sizes that physicians and perhaps 
hospitals owe fiduciary duties to 
their patients. Medical ethics has 
traditionally separated the delivery 
of care from ordinary market­
place mores and profit­maximiz­
ing pricing. Building on this tra­
dition, professional ethics could 
require providers to set prices that 
explicitly consider the interests of 
their patients as consumers with 
limited resources. Australia’s med­
ical profession has assumed this 
fiduciary role. In response to 
growing concern that providers 
were charging patients with pri­
vate insurance 50 to 100% more 
than those covered only by the 
government, Australian doctors 
committed to telling patients in 
advance (when possible) how 
much they would pay out of pock­
et for a chosen course of treat­
ment.4 As a result, more than 
half of privately insured Austra­
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lian patients with planned hos­
pital admissions in 2007 gave fi­
nancial consent to prices their 
providers specified in advance.5
A third approach is price reg­
ulation. Section 9007 of the ACA, 
for example, recognizes that list 
prices frequently do not reflect 
market forces and thus requires 
tax­exempt hospitals to collect 
from low­income uninsured pa­
tients “not more than the amounts 
generally billed to individuals who 
have insurance.” Some state laws 
use similar mechanisms but with 
alternative benchmarks. A Cali­
fornia law, passed in 2006, caps 
charges for the uninsured on the 
basis of Medicare rates, and a 
2008 Illinois law links such caps 
to the cost of care. These regula­
tory approaches are consistent 
with a more broadly held belief 
that price regulation is necessary 
to correct certain market failures 
in health care, but they offer solu­
tions only to uninsured patients 
in nonprofit hospitals and do not 
address the larger problems of 
billing for out­of­network care.
A fourth approach — the sim­
plest and most preferable one, in 
our view — follows a logic akin 
to that of implied contracts. An 
implied­contracts approach would 
obligate a patient to pay whatever 
amount a prudent patient and 
provider would have agreed to, 
given appropriate time and infor­
mation. The best proxy for in­
formed bargaining is what simi­
larly situated consumers and 
providers actually bargain for — 
namely, the rates negotiated be­
tween providers and private in­
surers. After all, insurers are 
purchasers that possess sufficient 
information and options to nego­
tiate market rates. Another use­
ful proxy might be Medicare re­
imbursement rates, because those 
rates — offered by the govern­
ment and accepted by providers, 
who are permitted to refuse — 
also approximate the lower end 
of the range of prices that a rea­
sonably informed negotiation 
would produce.
An implied­contracts approach 
prevents overbilling of both un­
insured patients and patients who 
receive care outside negotiated 
networks. It also offers a method 
for defining widespread and inten­
tionally ambiguous price terms 
found in the fine print of con­
tracts that litter the health care 
marketplace, such as “usual” or 
“customary” prices. The law fre­
quently fills in the gaps in am­
biguous or incomplete contracts, 
not only when negotiations are 
impossible (as when an uncon­
scious patient requires emergency 
care) but also when parties, for 
whatever reason, fail to produce 
fully specified contracts.
It is U.S. medicine’s discom­
fort with discussing prices — 
and, it must be said, the finan­
cial advantages of doing business 
this way — that makes so many 
medical contracts incomplete. Yet 
the law permits only what simi­
larly situated parties would have 
agreed to if negotiations had 
been complete, not what provid­
ers say is their individual custom. 
Contractual incompleteness gives 
neither providers nor patients a 
general license to fill in the con­
tractual gaps however they like 
after medical services are provid­
ed; instead, it enforces the con­
tract that both parties would have 
created themselves if time and 
capacity had permitted.
It is time to revisit some of 
the billing practices that have 
brought us to a state of finan­
cial crisis in health care, and the 
decoupling of the relationship be­
tween price and service is among 
the health care market’s biggest 
problems. Establishing informed 
financial consent as an essential 
element of medical practice would 
both fulfill the profession’s ethi­
cal commitment to patient auton­
omy and provide a much­needed 
market­based counterforce to price 
escalation. But until that happens, 
the doctrine of implied contracts 
can and should be used to curtail 
some of the most abusive billing 
practices.
Disclosure forms provided by the authors 
are available with the full text of this article 
at NEJM.org.
From Duke University School of Law 
(B.D.R.), the Health Sector Management 
Program, Fuqua School of Business, Duke 
University (B.D.R., K.A.S.), and Duke Clini-
cal Research Institute and Department of 
Medicine, Duke University School of Medi-
cine (K.A.S.) — all in Durham, NC; and 
Wake Forest University School of Law, the 
Translational Science Institute, and Depart-
ment of Social Sciences and Health Policy, 
Division of Public Health Sciences, Wake 
Forest University School of Medicine — all 
in Winston-Salem, NC (M.A.H.).
1. Anderson G. From ‘soak the rich’ to ‘soak 
the poor’: recent trends on hospital pricing. 
Health Aff (Millwood) 2007;26:780-9.
2. Witten JA. NFP litigation update: early de-
cisions by federal courts favor hospitals. 
Bloomberg BNA Health Law Rep 2005;14:79-
83.
3. Posner R. Economic analysis of law. 6th 
ed. New York: Aspen, 2003.
4. Informed financial consent: your right to 
know. Sydney: Australian Government Private 
Health Insurance Ombudsman (http://www 
.phio.org.au/facts-and-advice/informed- 
financial-consent.aspx).
5. Public and private hospitals: research re-
port. Melbourne, VIC: Australian Government 
Productivity Commission (http://www.pc 
.gov.au/projects/study/hospitals/report).
DOI: 10.1056/NEJMp1205225
Copyright © 2012 Massachusetts Medical Society.
Overbilling and Informed Financial Consent
